In this article, we critically analyse UK retailer, Tesco's September 2015 decision to sell its highly profitable South Korean subsidiary Homeplus to private investors. For over a decade since market entry in 1999, Homeplus had grown steadily to achieve a market-leading position through a process of strategic localization in which Tesco's global business practices were selectively adapted to meet the specific needs of the South Korean market. Against this backdrop, we explain the exit decision through theorising the dynamic intersection of home and host market factors that developed contemporaneously from 2010 onwards. On the one hand, worsening market conditions and financial pressures in a post-crisis UK domestic market drove Tesco to refocus on its home operations and, ultimately, identify saleable assets to offset mounting debts. On the other hand, steadily growing resistance within the South Korean market from competitors, regulators, labour and consumers caused sales growth to stall and then start to decline. Our analysis contributes to the economic geography literature on retail divestment by conceptualising the relational process of divestment decision-making that encompasses the intersection of home and host market pressures as well as conditions across the wider portfolio of subsidiaries. The research is particularly distinctive in its profiling of this coevolution of drivers, and in distilling the different 'domains' of host market contestation. The analysis also has wider significance in the context of the broader literatures on economic globalization that have tended to focus heavily on processes of expansion and market entry and far less on the instances of failure and exit that are an integral and inevitable part of these wider dynamics.
Conceptualising Contemporary Retail Divestment:

Tesco's Departure from South Korea
Introduction: an unexpected turn of events?
On 7 th September 2015, the UK grocery and general merchandise retailer Tesco released a statement on its website relating to its South Korean operations. In the statement, Dave Lewis, the Chief Executive of Tesco since July 2014, stated the following:
"After a highly competitive process, we are announcing today the proposed sale of Homeplus, our business in the Republic of Korea. This sale realises material value for shareholders and allows us to make significant progress on our strategic priority of protecting and strengthening our balance sheet.
I would like to thank all of our Homeplus colleagues for their dedication, professionalism and service to our customers, which has resulted in the creation of a great business. I am confident that the agreement we have reached with MBK Partners presents an exciting opportunity for their continued success." (Tesco, 2015) On face value, the sale of Homeplus (Tesco' s South Korean subsidiary) to a group of investors led by Asian private equity fund MBK Partners for approximately £4.2bn might make little sense. Indeed one commentator described it as 'selling the jewel in its crown ' (MoneyWeek, 2015) . Since entering the South Korean market in 1999 through a joint venture with Samsung's then troubled distribution arm, for the large part Homeplus expanded rapidly over the next 15 years in terms of revenues, employees and store numbers -as Asian revenues, 30 percent of international sales and 9 percent of its global total (i.e. including the UK). Homeplus also operated 139 shopping malls adjacent to its hypermarkets, in which over 6,500 tenants leased space, while its modern grocery market share of 12.7 percent was second only to the Shinsegae Group, owner of the E-Mart banner (Morgan Stanley, 2015) . While these do not seem like the characteristics of a struggling subsidiary, the above quotation and Table 1 do contain hints of the underlying processes at work in terms of the mention of 'protecting and strengthening our balance sheet', and with respect to the tailing-off of Homeplus' growth since 2011.
Previous accounts in the literature have characterised Homeplus as a successful example of retail globalization, describing how the firm was able to effectively 'strategic localize' its operations to meet the needs of the South Korean market and how, over time, it was able to progressively 'territorially embed' itself successfully in the host economy and society (Coe and Lee, 2006; . Key elements of the success were seen to be the use of local management executives -including the mercurial founder S. H. Lee who retired in 2014, the successful management of the joint venture with Samsung which created the perception, initially at least, that Homeplus was a local retailer, and the adoption of a hybrid corporate culture that blended knowledge of South Korean consumption practices with Tesco's efficient business practices (see Wood et al., 2016 , on how these traits were reflected in Tesco's Asia expansion more generally).
The attributes, in turn, engendered a deepening territorial embeddedness across three domains:
format innovations designed specifically for the South Korean market; developing relationships with the local supply base; and expansion into a wide range of new services (e.g. telecomm and financial services) along with a range of attempts to build a stronger relationship with South
Korean consumers in areas such as online shopping and environmental sustainability, even extending to establishing 'cultural centres' in its largest stores.
How then, against this backdrop, do we explain the decision of Tesco to exit from the South Korean market in late 2015? Our account is positioned against the broader literature on retail globalization and, more specifically, work that has sought to explain the continued prevalence of market exits even in a period since the late 1990s that overall has seen a strong aggregate trend of retail globalization . We use the Homeplus case to make three interlinked conceptual contributions to this literature. First, and as the Chief Executive's statement alludes, Tesco's decision was heavily shaped by home market considerations and financial drivers, in the context of a challenging post-2008 competitive climate, and a specific corporate crisis that unfolded in 2014. These factors need to take more analytical prominence in the literature. Second, we outline the emergence of growing resistance to the operations of Homeplus across four key domains -notably re-regulation, local competition, waning consumer confidence and increased labour resistance -which has intersected with other aspects of South Korean retailing such as an ageing population, saturation of large retail formats, and very high levels of online sales and served to slow and start to reverse
Homeplus' hitherto strong growth trends (Morgan Stanley, 2015) . These interconnected host market domains demand greater recognition in the literature. Third, and most saliently, we build upon the Homeplus case to argue that retail divestment decisions need to be theorised as occurring at the dynamic nexus of both home and multiple host country conditions; prioritising just one element of this nexus results in an incomplete picture of events. In the Tesco/South Korea case, this necessitates revealing the other assets that were considered for sale before the final divestment decision was reached.
For this study, we conducted an in-depth case study of Tesco's departure from South Korea, employing both qualitative and quantitative data. In South Korea, we relied on in-depth interviews with a research fellow and two retail academics focused on the broad background of grocery retail divestment and the specifics of the institutional background. In order to uncover the mechanics and decision-making context of the South Korean divestment, we also conducted semi-structured interviews with six leading UK based food retail analysts -four of whom were employed as equity analysts for investment banks. Equity analysts were selected for inclusion in the sample based on their profile within the financial market and their presence at invited analyst/investor meetings with the retailer. Drawing on analyst insights is increasingly employed within economic geography given the privileged access such actors enjoy to senior management within listed firms, which include 'off-the-record' discussions with executives stemming from 'industry-conference "break-out" sessions, site visits, regional tours, dinners with management, and so on' (Wrigley et al., 2003: 385) . Given the sensitive nature of the content of these discussions, our respondents were assured of their complete anonymity in any publishing of results. Mindful of the situated nature of analyst knowledge (Wood et al., 2017) , our primary data was complemented with − and triangulated by − archival analysis, and content analysis of news articles, for instance on conflicts between Tesco and local small merchants. We also used longitudinal data from both the Korean Chain Store Association and Tesco's annual reports, along with a wide range of other secondary sources. Therefore, our insights are both empirical and conceptual and derive from working 'backwards and forwards between theory and the empirical world in a reflexive manner ' (Clark, 2007: 191 
Theorising retailer market exit dynamics
Since the early 2000s, a vibrant multi-disciplinary literature on retail globalization and its multifarious impacts has emerged (see Coe and Wrigley, 2009, for an overview However, while the general trend has been for a progressive globalization of leading retailers in terms of both revenues and numbers of countries of operation, there is increasing evidence at the individual firm and market level that retail globalization has been far from the inevitable procession that some erroneously predicted in the early 2000s. Instead, and rather than some retailers proving to be 'good' at international expansion and others less so, the reality is a complex mosaic of success and failure as retailers from different home contexts have striven to adapt to widely varying host economy conditions. The study of retailer market exit, or divestment, has accordingly become a growing strand of the retail globalization literature since the early 2000s. This has aligned with the wider imperative of developing longitudinal, dynamic accounts of what happens to retail TNCs in host markets after the initial point of entry, the predominant focus of early management studies of the topic (Coe, 2004) . In successful cases, this may simply be a matter of facilitating subsequent growth through further investment and/or reinvesting profits (Dawson, 2003) . In other cases, however, retailers may be forced to undertake a relative or absolute withdrawal of investment from foreign markets. In line with a networked view of the retail TNC (Wrigley et al., 2005) , there is thus growing recognition that investments are actively and constantly being switched between national subsidiaries based on decisions about relative returns and profitability.
There are by now three intersecting lines of research into retailer divestment. First, there have been efforts to construct and analyse datasets of investment and divestment patterns, charting considerable levels of divestment activity even during periods of rapidly increasing retail foreign direct investment (e.g. Alexander et al., 2005; Burt et al., 2004) . These early, broad-based studies demonstrated that market exit was the predominant form of divestment, that divestment patterns were geographically highly variable, and that the majority of divestments were small scale in terms of store numbers and tended to occur within 5-10 years of entry.
Second, the past fifteen years have seen the emergence of a battery of firm case studies of divestment events and processes, largely focused on the fluctuating fortunes of European and US retailers such as Ahold Palmer and Quinn, 2007) , Home Depot (Yoder et al., 2016) , Tesco (Palmer, 2004) and Wal-Mart (Christopherson, 2007; Kim, 2008; Gandolfi and Strach, 2009 Jackson et al., 2004) . In a similar vein, Cairns et al. (2008 Cairns et al. ( , 2010 have contrasted 'corporate crisis' divestment -reflecting a lack of stability or focus amongst leadership and problems which stimulate a need to refocus on the domestic market -and 'positive restructuring' divestment characterised as an ongoing process of reinvention which may lead to new formats or approaches better suited to internationalisation. Second, we argue that there is a concomitant need for a greater focus on the developing host market conditions or what Coe and Wrigley (2017) term the 'domains of resistance' (see also Kim and Hallsworth, 2016) to retail TNC market expansion, which may develop to such a degree that they trigger, or significantly influence, divestment decisions. As Durand and Wrigley (2009: 1551) note, 'transnational retailers are not simply institution takers; rather, they contribute actively to influencing institutional change in the host economies they enter'. Four such domains of resistance are apparent from the existing literature. The first concerns processes of deregulation and re-regulation. Retail globalization processes were in part driven in the late 1990s
by deregulation of retail foreign direct investment across a range of emerging markets, allowing for significantly increased investment and ownership by foreign capital in the retail sector (Wrigley, 2000) . In the period since, however, it has become clear that the initial removal of trade barriers has been superseded by new sets of regulatory barriers specifically designed to protect domestic retailers. Nguyen et al. (2014: 378) use the term 're-regulation' to denote these subsequent developments, and highlight the ways in which they 'differentially impact on the operational costs of the multinational retailers and therefore become restrictive in terms of trade and investment'. Re-regulation is usually driven by controversy over the desirability of retail TNC-driven change, the perceived impacts on local small retailers, and retailer-supplier tensions as supply systems are radically and quickly transformed by inward investors. The second domain relates to resistance to TNC expansion from two distinct segments of the pre-existing retail structure. On the one hand, in the formalised sector, indigenous retailers have been able to rapidly and successfully imitate the organizational innovations and best practices of retail TNCs, whilst at the same time mobilising local institutional knowledge and social/political networks to erode their competitive advantage. 3 On the other hand, informal retail channels such as fresh/wet markets have proved remarkably resilient in cultural contexts where 'freshness' is prized, along with the accessibility, low cost and personalized shopping experience that such markets provide for low income consumers (Humphrey, 2007) . The third important domain of resistance concerns consumer preferences; rather than shop with retail TNCs, consumers may show loyalty to local stores/brands, or may prefer to continue shopping in traditional markets and small stores. More generally, it is well evidenced that consumer preferences and practices vary considerably across, and indeed within, different national contexts. This can be seen both in the varying levels of success of different formal retail formats -e.g. convenience stores, supermarkets and hypermarkets -across markets, and the similarly variable uptake of retail private label or own brand products (Shannon, 2014) .
The fourth dimension encompasses the resistance of local supply systems to changes initiated by retail TNCs. The seminal body of work on this topic by Reardon and co-authors (e.g. Reardon et al., 2007) has revealed the core processes at work, namely: the establishment of distribution centres and centralized procurement, the use of advanced logistics techniques, the shortening of supply networks and use of new forms of intermediaries, and the enforcement of private quality and safety standards. In reality, these changes play out highly unevenly across different product groups and, moreover, pre-existing supply structures may be more durable than expected, even when supplying to the modern retail sector (Endo, 2013) . In terms of the case analysed in this paper, however, supply system resistance is not an overly important factor, partly due to the strength of the South Korean supply base before the entry of retail TNCs, which has offset the subsequent bargaining power of large retailers (Coe and Lee, 2006) . There are, then, at least five potential sets of host markets factors -or domains of resistance -that may contribute to divestment decisions by retail TNCs. Importantly, these factors are market specific and dynamic -e.g. competition from domestic retailers or suppliers may build up over time. Moreover, the five factors may not all be due to increasing resistance to retail TNCs over time; conditions may be ameliorating in some areas, and getting tougher in others, depending on the specific national context.
Our third distinctive argument is that we need to bring together both these aspectshome country conditions and the changing landscape of host market resistance -into a dynamic, relational theory of market divestment. Importantly, however, divestment decisions are more nuanced than simply being determined by a singular home-host market dyadic relationship. We need to develop co-evolutionary accounts of market exit that recognise how both home and multiple host market elements develop over time and in relation to one another. The market conditions in a specific host economy are rarely judged in isolation, but rather on a comparative basis against other potentially saleable assets at a given point in time. The case study of divestment in this paper cannot be explained solely through developments in the UK home market, or in the South Korean host market, or through a combination of the two. Such accounts would miss the other subsidiaries whose performance and potentially saleability was actively considered as part of the decision-making processes. Divestment decisions are therefore the result of an avowedly relational process in which corporate managers intersect information on market performance across the home and a range of host market contexts. In turn, each of those contexts is not static but rather evolving dynamically in relation to local competitive and institutional conditions (i.e. the extent to which the different domains of resistance are 'in play') and it is the intersection of those trajectories that is integral to the corporate decision to divest (or not).
As we shall in what follows, in the case of Tesco's exit from South Korea, the initial impetus derived from Tesco's stuttering home market performance, which required further capital investment and management attention, and a troublesome company balance sheet that demanded debt levels to be quickly and significantly reduced. This, then, was in essence a 'corporate crisis' type divestment (Cairns et al., 2008; 2010) , in contrast to the more considered earlier exit from Japan (2012) and subsidiary restructuring (2013) in China which were much more heavily influenced by host market under-performance. Once a portfolio review was initiated, however, the decision to divest Homeplus specifically reflected the simultaneous pressures of few viable acquisition candidates amongst Tesco's subsidiary businesses, and a progressively more challenging South Korean host market context.
Tesco on the retreat in the UK -the anatomy of the 'push' towards divestment
In its February 2015 results, Tesco announced the biggest annual loss ever made by a UK retailer -£6.4bn. The deficit reflected £7bn worth of one-off costs, key elements of which were a £4.7bn loss from revaluation of its properties in the context of lower trading volumes and profits, and £416m in redundancy costs for over 10,000 employees. Sales were down 3 percent on the preceding year, and group trading profits were down 58 percent at £1.4bn. 43 store closures were announced. The results capped a terrible period for Tesco, the nadir of which was the discovery, in October 2014, of a £263m overstatement of profits to the City of London in 
Uncovering the process of divestment
Our interviews with the analyst community offered insights into the seemingly questionable decision to sell such a prized international subsidiary as Homeplus. After all, as international investors -generated significant cash at relatively short notice that could immediately be put against corporate debt on the balance sheet. A widely held contention was that the sheer size of the Homeplus business underpinned the transaction:
The only thing that it had that it could sell that would be big enough to fix its balance sheet, or at least shore it up to the extent that people would be happy, was Korea ( Homeplus. 4 However, our analysis has found that an array of host market factors were also instrumental in cementing the divestment -something that requires consideration of the changing conditions within the South Korean retail market, and the increasingly challenging environment being faced by Homeplus. It is to these we now turn.
Four domains of growing host market resistance in South Korea
Growing host market resistance in four domains also drove Tesco's exit from South Korea. The resistance from small and medium-sized local retailers, the loss of consumer trust, the conflict with the labour union, and the state's re-regulation all strongly influenced Tesco's decision to withdraw
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. We now consider each of these in turn.
i. Intensifying competition, and increased activism, from local retailers
Due to the state's policy to relax regulation of the retail market after the Asian financial crisis, global retailers such as Walmart, Carrefour, and Tesco were able to enter the South Korean market (see Table 3 ) and grew explosively alongside the Korean large chain retailers (Coe and Lee, 2006; . Their competition has intensified in the Korean market over time, while, in contrast, small and medium sized local merchants and traditional markets have seen a fast declining market share (Kim and Yoon, 2011; see Table 4 ).
Large chain retailers turned to super-supermarkets (SSMs) -which are larger than convenience stores and smaller than hypermarkets (usually in the range 1600-2600m Supermarkets, Homeplus Express, and GS Supermarkets, while E-Mart did not expand its SSMs as rapidly (see Table 4 5 While we present these developments in this paper as barriers to expansion from the Tesco perspective, we in no way mean to suggest in a more normative sense that these are regressive developments. From a South Korean perspective, the protection of local retailers and increasing unionisation levels, for instance, can be read in progressive terms.
the brink of bankruptcy (Table 4) . Overall, small business owners and traditional markets have lost market share while large discount stores and SSMs gained (Kim and Hallsworth, 2016) .
With severe local competition among large retailers, strong resistance to the expansion of SSMs mounted (Kim and Yoon, 2011 Homeplus for malpractices. Through these consumer groups, 2,200 customers of Homeplus filed a class action suit against Tesco for damages, claiming that it illegally sold information it collected through giveaway events and membership registrations (Women News, 2015) . These actions against Homeplus and the associated loss of trust prompted consumers to switch to online shopping as part of a wider trend of strong online penetration (see Table 5 ), and was another contributory factor in Tesco's decision to withdraw from the South Korean market.
iii. Collective labour pushes back
While Homeplus was renowned for a highly territorially embedded business model which enabled the company to be highly responsive to local consumers' tastes, in terms of labour relations it for a long time pursued an avowedly no union rule. The former CEO Lee Seng-Han's Shinbaram strategy to secure local employee loyalty was quite successful (Coe and Lee, 2006) , but he did not want labour recognition. Only one labour union existed, resulting from the incorporation of E-Land's Homever discount stores in 2008, and its influence was partial, with only 33 Homeplus discount stores out of 133 belonging to the union as of early 2013. Hence, there was no labour union covering all the stores of Homeplus until 27 March 2013, when a company-wide labour union was finally organized in Homeplus.
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Up until then, due to the absence of a labour union, workers in Homeplus were predominantly on non-standard contracts, providing both flexibility in staffing levels and efficiencies that could translate into net margins from the company perspective. In so doing,
Homeplus was not out of line with developments in the economy more generally, but its sheer size and foreign ownership made its labour relations a sensitive topic. According to Homeplus' labour deputy chief, 15,000 Homeplus workers out of the total of approximately 20,000 are nonstandard workers, 7 who are those with temporary, short-term or part-time contracts and dispatch (agency) workers (Joongang Daily, 2014) . These non-standard jobs pay low wages, provide few social insurance benefits and do not have implicit guarantees of long-term employment. Above all, the poor working conditions were the focus of controversy. Homeplus' notorious employment system was a '0.5 hour contract system', whose basic unit was not 1 hour but 0.5 hour or 0.2 hour. 8 Most non-standard workers were contracted to work 7.5 hours per day, including some unpaid 'getting ready' and 'finishing time' and had just a 30 minute lunch break (compared to one hour for workers on the regular eight hour day). They also worked substantial overtime for which they did not receive pay because it only brought them up to the statutory 40- The state's reaction to small and medium scale retailers' demands on regulation was not prompt; it delayed decision-making on the regulation of large discount stores and SSMs due to the strong opposition to the regulation from Trade Minister Kim Jong-hoon, and the ambassadors of the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) (Kim and Yoon, 2011) . In turn, the state's Small and Medium Business Administration (SMBA) delegated its authority on the business mediation system between large and small and medium enterprises to municipal governments in August 2009. After this delegation, a growing number of small merchants filed petitions in order to prevent the major large discount stores from entering into their traditional market areas (Daily Economy, 2009 ). According to the Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business, in the first two days after the delegation, a total of 13 petitions were filed in an attempt to hamper retail giants' entry into the small merchant neighbour niche markets; six cases against Homeplus Express, three against E-Mart Everyday, one each for GS Super and Lotte Super, and two for Busan-based Top-Mart (Daily Economy, 2009 ). Some of local governments accepted the small merchants' requests for temporary suspension or business reconsideration of SSMs and regulated opening days/hours and sale items to protect small merchants in locally owned neighbourhood markets (Korea Herald, 2009 ).
Homeplus actively sought to challenge these SSM regulations, while the other discount stores such as E-mart and Lotte-Mart, at least publicly, accepted them (Kim and Hallsworth, 2016) . Homeplus persistently opposed government policies and continued to expand its stores by changing the ownership structure towards franchising, which was not subject to these regulations, while E-Mart Everyday and Lotte Supermarket generally reflected public opinion and adhered to government policies (Korea Times, 2010a). Homeplus' expansion of its Express format was notably strong from 2011 onwards ( Table 1) Stanley, 2015) . While these may seem like small declines, it is important to remember that retailing is essentially a high volume/small net margin business and so such drops represent significant sums and may alter how a market is perceived, from a distance, by managers. 13 As one respondent commented, such (re)regulation undoubtedly helped pave the path to divestment: is clear that efforts to raise capital through their disposal were thwarted due to a shortage of potential acquirers.
Beyond the specifics, we have sought to use the Homeplus case to make three interlinked contributions to the literature on retail divestment. First, and most straightforwardly, our study is a reminder of the extent to which market exit decisions can be influenced by home country factors, and in particular underlying financial considerations and the need to appease the financial markets. Second, we have provided a framework for profiling the different host markets 'domains of resistance' that may come into play. Re-regulatory responses and competition from domestic retailers have received some attention hitherto in the literature, and in some contexts supplier pressure may be important; in the Homeplus case resistance from consumers and workers were also shown to be contributory factors. These five domains of resistancegovernment re-regulation, domestic retailer competition, supplier pressure, consumer movements and worker collective actions -may or may not be relevant in particular contexts, and may be moving in different directions in terms of resistance to TNC activity. In South Korea, the four domains we profiled all developed post-2010 in ways that made things increasingly difficult for Homeplus. Third, and most importantly, we conceptualised the exit decision as being framed by the dynamic interplay of these home and host market factors. We need to construct co-evolutionary accounts of market exit that recognise how both home and multiple host market elements develop over time and in relation to one another (see Figure 1 ). In terms of its globalization dynamics, and despite a notable upturn in aggregate activity since the late 1990s, retailing has proven to be a particularly fickle sector, with a complex mosaic of success and failures as transnational retailers have sought to gain a foothold in a wide range of emerging markets. Some previous accounts have undoubtedly underestimated the degree of resistance from the domains detailed in this paper, but also the extent to which they may strengthen over time as opposed to diminishing in the face of the power and resources of the retail TNCs. At the same time, the arguments in this paper also have wider resonance. In general terms, the economic geography literature on TNCs and global production networks tends to focus primarily -and understandably perhaps -on expansion and market entry, with much less research on markets exits and divestments, which may be equally if not more revealing analytically about globalization processes and the challenges and resistances that are inherent to them. There are thus important connections to be made to recent work that has focused on 'ruptures' and 'disarticulations' in global economic formations (Coe and Hess, 2011; Bair and Werner, 2011) . 
